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Abstract 
The argument that stringent environmental regulations are generally thought to harm 
export flows is crucial when determining policy recommendations related to 
environmental preservation and international competitiveness. By using bilateral trade 
data, we examine the relationships between trade flows and various environmental 
stringency indices. Previous studies have used energy intensity, abatement cost intensity, 
and survey indices for regulations as proxies for the strictness of environmental policy. 
However, they have overlooked the indirect effect of environmental regulations on trade 
flows. If the strong version of the Porter hypothesis is confirmed, we need to consider 
the effect of environmental regulation on GDP, because GDP induced by environmental 
regulation affects trade flows. The present study clarifies the effects of regulation on 
trade flows by distinguishing between the indirect and direct effects. Our results 
indicate an observed non-negligible indirect effect of regulation, implying that the 
overall effect of appropriate regulation benefits trade flows. 
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1 Introduction 
Strengthening environmental regulations may affect both the international 
competitiveness of firms and the leakage of pollutants through changes in trade flows. 
Thus, the effect of regulations on trade flows is crucial in policy debates. This topic has 
been explored extensively in the past decade (e.g., Copeland and Taylor 2003), with 
policymakers and academic researchers tending to agree that more stringent 
environmental regulations require abatement costs, which thereby increases production 
costs and may result in weaker industry competitiveness (Pethig 1976; McGuire 1982; 
Jenkins 1998). On the other hand, Porter and van der Linde (1995) suggest that 
environmental regulations encourage the development of new production processes and 
can thus confer comparative advantage. Moreover, while some empirical studies have 
found that stricter regulations reduce trade flows (e.g., Van Beers and Van den Bergh 
1997), other studies have indicated the opposite result (Costantini and Crespi 2008). 
The inconclusiveness of the findings of previous studies may be because they 
overlook both the direct and the indirect effects of regulation. Regulation may increase 
GDP and thus raise export flows. In addition, the strong version of the Porter hypothesis 
claims that environmental regulation enhances economic performance—at least in the 
medium run—for compliant firms, the sector to which they belong, and, eventually, the 
economy as a whole. In particular, Costantini and Mazzanti (2012) find evidence in 
support of the strong Porter hypothesis. 
The contradictory nature of the results of previous research might also be driven 
by authors using various proxies of environmental variables. Energy intensity, 
abatement cost intensity, and survey indices have been generally used as proxies for the 
stringency of regulations. However, each of these proxies is distinct. Energy intensity, 
defined as energy use relative to the gross domestic product (GDP), is likely to reflect 
regulations that are strongly related to energy, whereas abatement cost intensity, defined 
as abatement cost relative to GDP, tends to reflect regulations that relate to a relatively 
wide range of industries. Moreover, previous works have typically used three survey 
indices: the survey conducted at the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) in 1976, the one conducted at the United Nations Conference 
on Environment and Development (UNCED) in 1992, and those conducted by the 
Center for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN) in 2002 and 2005. 
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These indices indicate not only the stringency of the environmental legislation but also 
the length of its existence, the industries the policy applies to, and the degree of 
environmental awareness displayed by the citizens of that particular country (Xu 2000). 
This study clarifies how various environmental regulation proxies affect export 
flows, by estimating both the indirect and the direct effects. No previous study has thus 
far investigated these individual effects. Which version of the Porter hypothesis should 
be better investigated at the empirical level has been widely debated. The distinction 
between the strong and weak versions of the hypothesis gives rise to a different choice 
in the dependent variable adopted in the empirical model. The former version refers to 
an increase in economic scale, while the latter refers to an improvement in 
environmental technology. Indeed, the basic distinction often explains the divergent 
results (see Ambec et al. 2010 for recent reviews). Hence, our study aims to show (i) 
whether the strong version of the Porter hypothesis is confirmed and (ii) the overall 
effect of regulation on export flows. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the 
background. Section 3 explains our model and Section 4 discusses the empirical results. 
The last section concludes and contextualizes our findings. 
 
2 Background 
In this section, we summarize the research findings on this topic (see Table 1 
for a summary). Van Beers and Van den Bergh (1997) employ the gravity model, using 
two indices, namely their own stringency index1 and an index based on energy intensity. 
By using data from OECD countries in 1992, they conclude that environmental 
stringency has a statistically significant negative effect on international competitiveness. 
Harris et al. (2002) use a three-way fixed-effects model that allows for the importing 
country, the exporting country, and time-specific effects. By using an index based on 
the energy intensity of 24 OECD countries from 1990 to 1996, they find a relationship 
between stringency and trade flows without these specific fixed effects. However, its 
significance fades when the importing or exporting country effects are taken into 
                                                   
1 This index was constructed from seven variables: protected areas as a percentage of the national 
territory in 1990, the market share of unleaded petrol in 1990, the recycling rate for paper in 1990, the 
recycling rate for glass in 1990, the percentage of the population connected to sewage treatment plants in 
1991, the level of energy intensity in 1980, and changes in energy intensity from 1980 to 1991. 
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consideration. Jug and Mirza (2005) use 12 European Union (EU) countries’ abatement 
costs, measured as the total current expenditure provided by Eurostat, to examine the 
relationship between relative stringency and export flows. They modify the empirical 
gravity equations used by Van Beers and Van den Bergh (1997) and by Harris et al. 
(2002) as well as consider the issue of endogeneity, finding statistically significant 
negative effects on international competitiveness using OLS, fixed-effects estimates, 
and the generalized method of moments (GMM) procedure with instrumental variables 
(IVs). 
Xu (2000) uses 1992 UNCED data2,3 for 20 countries and finds a positive 
relationship between environmental stringency and aggregate export flows using OLS. 
In addition, Costantini and Crespi (2008) find a positive relationship between abatement 
cost intensity and export flows, although they focus on energy technology. Furthermore, 
Costantini and Mazzanti (2012) test the strong and narrowly strong versions of the 
Porter hypothesis4 and find evidence in support of both for the EU in 1996–2007 using 
abatement cost intensity, energy tax, environmental tax, and the Eco-Management and 
Audit Scheme initiatives. These results indicate that environmental regulations may 
have a positive effect on international competitiveness. 
 
(Insert Table 1) 
 
As described in the Introduction, previous studies have tended to use three 
proxies of environmental regulations: energy intensity, abatement cost intensity, and 
                                                   
2 The survey here used 25 questions to categorize (1) environmental awareness levels; (2) the scope of 
the policies adopted; (3) the scope of the legislation enacted; (4) control mechanisms put in place; and (5) 
the degree of success in implementing the legislation. For each report, 25 questions were answered for 20 
elements; therefore, 500 assessment scores were obtained for each country. The possible assessment 
scores were 0, 1, and 2. Each country’s score ranged from 0 to 1000. The more stringent the assessment, 
the higher the score was. 
3 This survey included both developed and developing countries, and is comparable among countries 
because the United Nations imposed a standard reporting format (see Dasgupta et al. 2001 for more 
details). The indices developed by Dasgupta et al. (2001) and Eliste and Fredriksson (2002) are hereafter 
referred to as the DMRW index and EF index, respectively. Dasgupta et al. (2001) randomly select 31 
UNCED reports from a total of 145. Eliste and Fredriksson (2002) extend this dataset to 62 countries 
using the same methodology as Dasgupta et al. (2001). While their measure of the stringency of 
environmental regulations is an index for the agricultural sector, it sufficiently reflects the stringency of 
all sectors. In fact, the correlations for each sector’s score in Eliste and Fredriksson (2002) range from 
0.855 to 0.968. 
4 The narrowly strong version of the Porter hypothesis meets the definition that a more stringent 
regulatory framework might positively impact only the green side of the economy. 
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survey indices5. Studies using energy intensity have not obtained robust results. When 
the endogeneity of stringency or fixed effects are taken into consideration, the 
estimation results become statistically insignificant (e.g., Harris et al. 2002). By contrast, 
studies using abatement cost intensity obtain statistically significant results. Their 
findings indicate that environmental regulations may have a negative effect on 
aggregate trade flows (e.g., Jug and Mirza 2005), except in the energy industry (e.g., 
Costantini and Crespi 2008). Finally, the results obtained using the UNCTAD index 
present statistically significant positive effects (Xu 2000). 
 
3 Empirical Strategy 
3.1 Model 
3.1.1 GDP per worker model 
We consider both the direct and indirect effects of environmental policy on 
export flows. In terms of the indirect effect, the degree to which environmental policy 
may affect GDP and thus export flows depends on whether the strong version of the 
Porter hypothesis is confirmed. To examine this indirect effect, we use the following 
model of GDP per worker: 
 
      ztztztztztzt Strsky   )ln(lnlnln 321  (1) 
 
 This model, based on Barro and Lee (2010), uses the Cobb–Douglas 
production function. Here, z denotes country z; t denotes the year; tzy  denotes real 
GDP per worker6; t  denotes the time-fixed effects; z  denotes the country-fixed 
effects; tzk  denotes capital stock per worker; tzs  denotes average years of schooling 
(for the population aged 15 and over); 
tzStr  denotes the stringency of the 
environmental policy; and tz  denotes the error term. Barro and Lee (2010) consider 
output to be determined by the product of total factor productivity, the stock of physical 
                                                   
5 Although Costantini and Mazzanti (2012) use abatement cost, energy tax, environmental tax, and the 
Eco-Management and Audit Scheme initiatives as proxies of environmental regulation, our study focuses 
on abatement cost to ensure comparability with previous research. 
6 We use GDP per worker instead of GDP per capita following Barro and Lee (2010). 
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capital, and human capital stock. These three factors correspond to t , tzk , and tzs , 
respectively. They further assume that human capital per worker is related to the number 
of years of schooling that a person receives. In our model, we also consider the 
relationship between human capital per worker and the stringency of environmental 
regulations. 
 Following Barro and Lee (2010), in our model, we use 10-year lagged k as an 
IV for k and the 10-year lags in s for individuals aged 40–74 years old as an IV for s. 
We also use adjusted savings from CO2 damage and from particulate emissions (PE) 
damage (during the previous five years on average) as the IVs for stringency. Previous 
studies have addressed the simultaneity problem of the stringency variables. Since the 
environment might be considered a superior good, its demand (and therefore 
environmental stringency) increases with GDP levels. In addition, higher levels of net 
imports (i.e., a trade deficit) may help relax environmental regulations, thereby affecting 
trade flows (Trefler 1993; Ederington and Minier 2003). Rose and Spiegel (2009) use 
adjusted savings from CO2 damage and from PE damage as IVs. These values are 
considered to be measures of actual and potential environmental damage. They therefore 
tend to correlate with the stringency variables, whereas they do not directly affect trade 
flows and are weakly correlated with trade flows7,8. We use these IVs to estimate equation 
(1). 
To analyze abatement cost intensity and energy intensity, we use fixed-effects 
and random-effects estimations with IVs, whereas to consider the survey indices, we use 
two-stage least squares regressions. Then, we calculate the fitted value of GDP to 
include in equation (2), as described in the next subsection. 
                                                   
7 We also consider two factors that influence stringency: environmental quality as a normal good and the 
cost of compliance. A country that strengthens its environmental regulations can be seen as a member of a 
group of nations that voluntarily provides a public good, because additional demand for environmental 
quality comes with higher levels of wealth. We follow Cole and Elliott (2003) by suggesting that the key 
determinant of stringency is per capita income and considering a country’s average GNP per capita and the 
lagged five years as IVs. Following Ederington and Minier (2003), we also consider the political-economy 
variable to be an IV. GNP per capita is taken from the World Development Indicators (WDI). As 
political-economy variables, we obtain the “polity” score from the Polity IV dataset. This index ranges 
from −10 (a high autocracy) to 10 (a high democracy). Although we do not show the results because of 
space limitations, when we use these IVs in place of the adjusted savings from CO2 damage and from PE 
damage, we obtain results almost identical to our main results. 
8 Jug and Mirza (2005) also consider the endogeneity of environmental regulations. Because of data 
limitations, we are not able to incorporate their IVs into this paper. These data are available only for EU 
countries. 
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3.1.2 Trade model 
 
As discussed in Section 2, the strong version of the Porter hypothesis refers to an 
increase in economic scale. We address this issue by using the following gravity model 
in line with Costantini and Mazzanti (2012)9,10: 
 
ijtjtit6ijtij4
ijtijtijttijt
StrStrRTADist            
EndwSimMassExp




)ln()ln()ln( 75
321
, (2) 
 
where i and j denote exporters and importers, respectively, and t denotes the year. Exp , 
 , and t  represent the bilateral export flows from country i to country j, a constant 
term, and the time-fixed effects, respectively. Dist , RTA , Str , and ijt  represent 
the distance between country i and country j, a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if 
i and j belong to the same regional trade agreement and 0 otherwise, the stringency of 
environmental regulations, and the error term, respectively. 
Following Costantine and Mazzanti (2012), we consider a synthetic measure of 
the impact of country-pair size as a proxy of the “mass” in gravity models ( ijtMass ): 
 
 
jtitijt GDPGDPMass  ln , (3) 
 
We then use the fitted values of GDP obtained in equation (1) to consider the 
indirect effect of Str. We also consider a measure of relative country size by computing 
the similarity index of the GDPs of two trading partners ( ijtSim ) calculated as in Egger 
                                                   
9 In gravity models, it is better to either consider some of the effects associated with heterogeneity as 
asserted by Helpman et al. (2008) or treat country effects in a panel context as discussed by Baldwin and 
Taglioni (2006). As a robustness check, we include country-fixed effects (i.e., exporter and importer fixed 
effects or trade pair fixed effects) in our model. The results are almost identical to the results in equation 
(1) (see also footnote 17). 
10 Recently, the literature on gravity models has developed the use of multilateral resistance variables 
(Anderson and van Wincoop 2003). However, GDP and other time-varying variables cannot be used 
because of the application of the exporter-time or importer-time dummies. Therefore, we do not include 
these terms. 
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(2000): 
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where GDP represents the fitted values of GDP obtained in equation (1). The larger this 
measure, the more similar the two countries are in terms of their GDPs and the greater is 
the expected share of intra-industry trade. 
We also consider a measure of the distance between the relative endowment of 
domestic assets ( ijtEndw ), which is approximated by equation (5), where GDP per 
capita is a proxy of the capital/labor ratio of each country: 
 

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
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

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jt
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it
ijt
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GDP
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GDP
Endw lnln , (5) 
  
where GDP represents the fitted values of GDP obtained in equation (1) and POP 
corresponds to the population. The larger this difference, the higher the volume of 
inter-industry trade and the lower the share of intra-industry trade should be11. 
 We use the Poisson pseudo maximum likelihood model following Tenreyro 
(2007), which identifies some of the issues associated with log-linearizing in the gravity 
model. The log-normal model is based on the questionable assumption that the error 
terms have the same variance for all pairs of origins and destinations (homoskedasticity). 
In the presence of heteroskedasticity, both the efficiency and the consistency of the 
                                                   
11 Costantini and Mazzanti (2012) consider the role of innovative capacity by using “general R&D 
expenditure by public institutions for environmental protection purposes,” which is obtained from 
Eurostat. It is important to consider the role of technological capabilities also in our analysis. Because the 
data obtained from Eurostat covers smaller number of countries than “Research and development 
expenditures (% of GDP)” obtained from the World Development Indicators (WDI), we tried to use the 
data from the WDI to consider the role of technological capabilities. However, the data period of the data 
from WDI is from 1996, so that we cannot include it for the model including the DMRW index or EF 
index. Therefore, we decided to use the data from WDI as a robustness check. We include it into equation 
(1) as an additional explanatory variable, predict the fitted values of GDP, and use the fitted values in 
equation (2) as predicted GDPs, obtaining results almost identical to our main results. We show these 
results in Appendix C. 
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estimators are at stake (Silva and Tenreyro 2006; Burger et al. 2009). Silva and Tenreyro 
(2006) also mention that pairs of countries with zero-valued bilateral trade flows are 
omitted from the sample as a result of the logarithmic transformation. Zero-valued 
observations contain important information for understanding the patterns of bilateral 
trade, and should not be discarded a priori (Burger et al. 2009). This necessity can create 
additional bias. In our estimation, the number of observations is about 20% higher when 
we use the Poisson model than when we use OLS. 
 
3.2 Data 
3.2.1 Stringency variables 
In this study, several types of policy variables are used based on previous studies, 
including energy intensity, abatement cost intensity, the UNCED index, and the CIESIN 
index. Energy intensity is calculated as energy use (kg of oil equivalent) divided by real 
GDP (constant $). Data on energy use and real GDP are obtained from the World 
Development Indicators (WDI). We extend the seven-year time span from 1990–1996 
used by Harris et al. (2002) to include 1990–2003. We also extend our country sample 
from 24 OECD countries, as in Harris et al. (2002), to 89 countries, including both 
developing and developed nations12. 
Abatement cost intensity is calculated as abatement cost divided by GDP 
following Jug and Mirza (2005) and Costantini and Crespi (2008). Abatement cost 
intensity corresponds to Current environmental protection expenditure (public+industry) 
as % of GDP, which is obtained from Eurostat. The time span in our study is extended 
from 1996–1999, as in Jug and Mirza (2005), to 1996–2003. 
Two types of UNCED indices are constructed following Dasgupta et al. (2001) 
and Eliste and Fredriksson (2002). With regard to the CIESIN index, we use “WEFSTR 
for 2000” from the 2001 Environmental Sustainability Index (ESI), “WEFGOV for 
2001” from the 2002 ESI, and “WEFGOV for 2003” from the 2005 ESI. Table 2 
presents the details of these indices. These survey indices reflect not only the strictness 
of the regulations but also their quality. The UNCED index includes answers to various 
                                                   
12 We exclude Middle Eastern countries from our estimation sample (Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, 
Bahrain, Kuwait) because they use extremely large quantities of energy and including them would cause 
heterogeneity (see Figure 1). 
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questions, such as “For how long has a significant environmental policy existed?”, 
“How did the policy evolve?”, and “What is the coverage of the policy?” (see Dasgupta 
et al. 2001 for more details). The CIESIN index measures quality by inquiring about the 
“clarity and stability of regulations,” the “flexibility of regulations,” “environmental 
policy leadership,” and the “consistency of regulation enforcement.” We list the 
countries in Appendix A. 
 
(Insert Table 2) 
 
Real GDP per capita tends to be correlated with the stringency of regulations, as 
discussed in Managi et al. (2009), because higher incomes encourage stricter regulation 
as a result of greater demand for a better environment. To confirm this relationship, 
Figure 1 shows the simple scatter plots for the relationship between the environmental 
stringency variables and GDP per capita. Although we find positive correlations 
between them, there is a large degree of variance in our sample. 
 
(Insert Figure 1 and Figure 2) 
 
Figure 2 shows the scatter plots for the stringency indices for 2000. Concerning 
the relationship between energy intensity and WEFSTR, we note a correlation of –0.66, 
which confirms the presence of variance. For countries with low WEFSTR, we find a 
wide range of energy intensities, while countries with high WEFSTR have relatively 
low energy intensities. This finding implies that countries with high WEFSTR tend to 
be energy efficient. On the other hand, there is a large degree of variance between 
abatement cost intensity and WEFSTR (correlation: –0.33). Like the relationship 
between WEFSTR and energy intensity, countries with high WEFSTR tend to have 
relatively low abatement cost intensities. Because a strong positive correlation exists 
between WEFSTR and GDP per capita, economic growth tends to lead to more 
stringent environmental regulation in terms of WEFSTR. In addition, we find a large 
degree of variance between abatement cost intensity and energy intensity (correlation: 
0.23). Abatement costs may be mainly spent by firms in the manufacturing sector, while 
energy is mainly spent by energy-intensive companies such as those in the iron and steel 
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sectors. The large variance among the stringency indices in Figure 2 suggests that each 
proxy of environmental regulations is distinct. 
 
3.2.2 Other variables 
We obtain bilateral export flow data from the Direction of Trade Statistics 
provided by the International Monetary Fund. Data on GDP and population are taken 
from the WDI. Data for distance and the regional trade agreement dummy are obtained 
from the Rose dataset (see Rose 2005; Rose and Spiegel 2009). The adjusted savings 
from CO2 damage and from PE damage are obtained from the WDI
13. Following Rose and 
Spiegel (2009), we use the average values for the past five years as the IV. Finally, real 
GDP per worker is obtained from the Penn World Tables 6.3 and capital stock per 
worker from the Extended Penn World Tables14. Data on average years of schooling 
come from Barro and Lee (2010). 
 
4 Results 
4.1 GDP per worker model 
The estimated results of equation (1) are shown in Table 3. We assume human 
capital per worker to be related to average years of schooling and the stringency of the 
environmental regulations in question. We expect the coefficient of capital stock per 
worker to be positive based on the Cobb–Douglas production function and that of 
average years of schooling to be positive based on the endogenous economic growth 
literature. On the other hand, the expected signs of the stringency variables are unclear. 
As discussed in Section 1, it is generally believed that more stringent environmental 
regulations require abatement costs and therefore increase production costs. In such a 
case, strict regulations may lower production. However, if the new production method 
improves environmental technology and leads to higher productivity, stringency might 
lead to more production (i.e., according to the strong version of the Porter hypothesis). 
As shown in Table 3, the results of the Hausman tests indicate that for both 
abatement cost intensity and energy intensity, the preferred model is to use random 
                                                   
13 CO2 damage is estimated to be $20 per ton of carbon (in 1995 $) multiplied by the number of tons of 
carbon emitted. PE damage is calculated as willingness to pay to avoid mortality attributable to PE. 
14 See http://homepage.newschool.edu/~foleyd/epwt/. 
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effects. Our main point of interest, the sign of the coefficients of the stringency 
variables, differs for different proxies. 
First, by examining abatement cost intensity, we obtain statistically significant 
negative results, which indicate that stricter environmental policy lowers GDP. On the 
other hand, concerning energy intensity, because more stringent environmental policy is 
correlated with less energy intensity, the negative coefficients for energy intensity 
indicate that GDP increases with strict environmental policies. This latter result suggests 
that the strong version of the Porter hypothesis is likely to hold. Here, abatement cost is 
thought to mainly reflect the costs incurred in the manufacturing sector and not 
necessarily be related to an increase in revenue. For instance, Shadbegian and Gray 
(2005) find that abatement expenditure contributes little or nothing to production15. On 
the other hand, energy-related technology improvement or adoption (i.e., energy 
efficiency) tends to be considered to have productivity benefits (Porter and Van der 
Linde 1995; Boyd and Pang 2000; Worrell et al. 2003; Zhang and Wang 2008; Kounetas 
et al. 2012). Porter and Van der Linde (1995) suggest that energy efficiency leads to 
productivity improvement. Our result on energy intensity is thus consistent with the 
strong version of the Porter hypothesis. 
With regard to the survey indices, we obtain statistically significant positive 
signs only for the WEFSTR and WEFGOV for 2001 indices. These positive signs 
indicate that stricter regulations increase GDP, suggesting that the strong version of the 
Porter hypothesis is likely to hold. The survey indices reflect not only the strictness of 
environmental regulations but also their consistency and stability. Hence, there is a 
possibility that the strong version of the Porter hypothesis is supported because the 
survey indices tend to capture regulation quality.  
In addition, for the other variables, we generally obtain the expected signs16. 
 
4.2 Trade model 
In this subsection, we show the estimation results for equation (2). For the 
robustness check of the estimation results for abatement cost intensity and energy 
                                                   
15 These authors also examine within-industry heterogeneity, estimating separate impacts for subgroups 
of plants. However, they find little evidence of significant differences across these groups. 
16 We obtain statistically insignificant coefficients for average years of schooling because of the 
correlation between this variable and the stringency variables. 
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intensity, we use three types of specifications, as shown in (a)–(f). Current 
environmental stringency variables are used in (a) and (d), whereas (b) and (e) use 
one-year-lagged environmental stringency variables and (c) and (f) use two-year-lagged 
environmental stringency variables. We consider the time-fixed effects by including a 
time dummy17. To consider the lag in the effect of regulations on trade flows using the 
survey indices, we use three types of cross-sectional data depending on the sample year, 
as shown in the tables18. 
 The estimated results of equation (2) are shown in Tables 4 and 5. Most of the 
coefficients of Mass, Sim, and Endw are consistent with those in Costantini and 
Mazzanti (2012). The estimates for distance are negative and statistically significant for 
all specifications. On the other hand, we obtain the unexpected or insignificant results 
for regional trade agreements except in two cases, perhaps because our sample is 
relatively small or some regional trade agreements are appropriate only for certain 
products. 
The coefficients of the stringency variables vary. First, with regard to the 
coefficients of abatement cost intensity, we obtain statistically significant negative signs, 
consistent with the findings of Jug and Mirza (2005). This result implies that stricter 
regulations in exporting countries have a negative effect on their export flows, on 
average. This effect is the direct effect of the stringency variables on aggregate trade 
flows. We discuss the effect of GDP induced by the stringency variables (i.e., the 
“indirect” effect) in the next subsection. 
Second, concerning the coefficients of exporter energy intensity, we obtain 
statistically significant negative signs in contrast to those of Harris et al. (2002). There 
is a possibility that this is because they do not consider the endogeneity issue (if we 
exclude IVs, we obtain statistically insignificant results). 
Finally, for the coefficients of the exporter survey indices (specifications (g) to 
(s)), some coefficients are positive and statistically significant19. This result generally 
implies the positive direct effects of environmental regulation in line with the findings 
                                                   
17 As a robustness check, we also include exporter and importer fixed effects and obtain almost the same 
results for the stringent variables as those presented in Tables 4 and 5. 
18 We could not implement a panel analysis because each survey index captures the status of the 
regulations during just one year. 
19 We obtain statistically insignificant coefficients for the DMRW index and WEFGOV for 2001. This 
may be because their observations are relatively small. 
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of Xu (2000)20. 
In summary, on average, the abatement cost intensity has a negative effect on 
aggregate export flow, whereas the results regarding energy intensity and the survey 
indices suggest positive effects on aggregate export flows21. As we have already 
mentioned, we should consider overall effects of the stringency variables by considering 
not only direct effects but also indirect effects. We calculate these effects in the next 
subsection. 
 
4.3 Direct and indirect effects 
While the stringency of environmental policy affects GDP (see Section 4.1), an 
increase in GDP induced by the environmental policy increase aggregate export flows 
(see Section 4.2), which is considered to be an indirect effect of environmental policy 
on aggregate export flows. In this subsection, we consider the overall effect of 
environmental policy. Table 6 shows the indirect, direct, and overall effects of each 
stringency variable. To calculate these elasticities, we use the estimated coefficients and 
sample means. We find that the direct effect of the stringency variables is statistically 
significant except for the DMRW index and WEFGOV for 2001. On the other hand, our 
results show that the indirect effect of the stringency variables is statistically significant 
with regard to abatement cost intensity, energy intensity, WEFSTR for 2000, and 
WEFGOV for 2001. We thus obtain statistically significant overall elasticities for 
abatement cost intensity, energy intensity, and WEFSTR for 2000. Further, the 
magnitude of the indirect effect is not relatively small compared with the direct effect. 
This finding confirms that it is necessary to consider not only the direct effect of the 
stringency variables on export flows but also the effect of GDP (i.e., the indirect effect). 
The results for abatement cost intensity show that both the direct and the 
indirect elasticities are negative and statistically significant, meaning that a 1% increase 
in abatement cost intensity results in a 0.078% decrease in aggregate export flows, on 
                                                   
20 As a robustness check, we estimate equation (1) by using the decomposed indices for WEFSTR, 
WEFGOV for 2001, and WEFGOV for 2003. The decomposed indices are shown in Appendix B. Most 
of these results are consistent with those of our aggregate-level estimation. The results are available upon 
request. 
21 As a robustness check, we obtain sector-level export flow data from the Global Trade Atlas. We refer 
to sectors using two-digit HS codes. Most of these results using these data are consistent with those of our 
aggregate-level estimation. The results are available upon request. 
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average. This finding implies that more stringent environmental policy in terms of 
abatement cost intensity tends to lower aggregate export flows, on average. On the other 
hand, on average, a 1% decrease in energy intensity leads to a 0.013% increase in 
aggregate export flows as a result of the direct effect and a 0.005% increase as a result 
of the indirect effect. In other words, a 1% decrease in energy intensity results in a 
0.018% increase in aggregate export flows, on average. This finding implies, on average, 
more stringent environmental policy in terms of energy intensity tends to increase 
aggregate export flows. 
With regard to the survey indices, we obtain a statistically significant overall 
elasticity only for WEFSTR for 2000. In other words, the estimation results for the 
survey indices are not robust, perhaps because of the relatively small sample size used. 
The result of WEFSTR for 2000 shows that both the direct and the indirect elasticities 
are positive and statistically significant, meaning that a 1% increase in WEFSTR for 
2000 results in a 0.053% increase in aggregate export flows, on average. This finding 
implies that more stringent environmental policy in terms of the survey index 
(WEFSTR for 2000) tends to increase export flows. 
To summarize, the strong version of the Porter hypothesis is confirmed for 
energy intensity and WEFSTR for 2000, resulting in an increase in export flows, while 
it is not confirmed for abatement cost intensity. 
 
5 Conclusion and discussion 
Our results indicate that, on average, while an increase in abatement cost 
intensity negatively affects aggregate export flows, a decrease in energy intensity and an 
increase in the survey indices positively affect aggregate export flows. Our results also 
show that an increase in abatement cost intensity decreases both aggregate export flows 
and GDP, on average. Since the abatement cost is mainly related to manufacturing 
sectors, our result implies its average effect in this sector is negative, while energy 
intensity tends to reflect energy-intensive sectors such as cement and steel. However, as 
mentioned in footnote 18, our subsample (sector-level) estimations imply the negative 
effects of abatement costs for these energy-intensive sectors. Therefore, rather than the 
amount of abatement costs, how abatement costs are applied may positively affect 
aggregate export flows and GDP. In other words, the positive effect of energy intensity 
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may imply that the policy outcome is crucial to the increase in export flows or GDP. 
Moreover, while abatement costs do not necessarily improve energy efficiency (i.e., 
energy intensity), energy intensity does tend to reflect the outcome of applying such 
costs. The survey indices capture both the strictness of the regulations and their quality. 
The positive effect of the survey index thus implies the importance of quality when 
formulating environmental regulations. Overall, our results confirm the importance of 
considering either the quality of environmental regulations or the efficiency of the 
abatement cost. 
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Appendix A 
 
(Insert Table A.1 and Table A.2) 
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Appendix B: Decomposed indices  
 
The decomposed indices are available for WEFSTR for 2000, WEFGOV for 
2001, and WEFGOV for 2003; we obtained these decomposed indices from the World 
Economic Forum 2000, 2002, and 2004. The survey questions are shown in Table B.1. 
 
(Insert Table B.1) 
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Appendix C: Robustness check 
We include “R&D expenditure” obtained from the World Development Indicators into 
our GDP per worker models. Table C-1 presents the estimation results, showing that we 
obtained statistically significant coefficients for the stringency variables except for 
WEFGOV2001. This finding is almost in line with the estimated results of the models 
excluding R&D expenditure. Moreover, by using the estimated coefficients in Table C.1, 
we predict the fitted value of GDP to estimate the trade model. The estimation results of 
the trade model are shown in Tables C.2 and C.3. These results are also almost in line 
with our main results. 
 
(Insert Table C.1, Table C.2, and Table C.3) 
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Figure 1. Simple scatter plots between stringency indices and GDP per capita 
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Figure 2. Relationship among stringency indices (year=2000) 
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Table 1. Previous studies applying gravity modeling 
Authors Stringency variable Data Method Instru
ments 
Sector Result (+: positive effect on international 
competitiveness, -: negative effect on international 
competitiveness) 
Van Beers and Van den 
Bergh (1997) 
Their original index 
and an index based 
on energy intensity 
21 OECD countries, 
1992 
OLS No Aggregate, 
footloose, and 
dirty 
[Exporter stringency] 
Aggregate and footloose: Significant (–) 
Dirty: Insignificant 
Xu (2000) UNCED survey 20 countries, 1992 OLS No Aggregate, 
environmentally 
sensitive goods 
(ESGs) and 
non-resource-ba
sed ESGs 
[Exporter stringency] 
Significant (+) 
Harris et al. (2002) Index based on 
energy intensity 
24 OECD countries, 
1990–1996 
Fixed effects No Aggregate, 
footloose, and 
dirty 
[Exporter stringency] 
Fixed effects: Insignificant 
Jug and Mirza (2005) Total current 
expenditure 
Exporters: 19 EU 
countries 
Importers: 12 EU 
countries, 1996–1999 
OLS, Fixed 
effects, and 
GMM with IV 
Yes Nine sectors [Relative stringency] 
Significant (–) 
Costantini and Crespi 
(2008) 
Total current 
expenditure 
20 OECD countries, 
1996–2005 
OLS, Fixed 
effects, FEGLS 
estimator, and 
IV estimator 
Yes Energy 
technology 
[Exporter’s relative stringency] 
Significant (+) 
Costantini and 
Mazzanti (2012) 
Energy tax, 
Environment tax, 
Pace*, and Emas** 
(Eurostat) 
14 EU countries, 
1996-–2007 
Dynamic panel 
data analysis 
Yes Manufacturing 
sectors (19 
sectors) 
[Exporter’s stringency]] 
Significant (+) 
* Pace corresponds to pollution abatement and control expenditures as a percentage of GDP. 
** Emas corresponds to the Number of Eco-Management and Audit Scheme initiatives by private firms as a percentage of GDP. 
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Table 2. Details of WEFSTR for 2000, WEFGOV for 2001, and WEFGOV for 2003 
Index The definition of the index (source: ESI) 
WEFSTR for 
2000 
Average responses to the following survey questions: “Air pollution regulations are among the world’s 
most stringent”; “Water pollution regulations are among the world’s most stringent”; “Environmental 
regulations are enforced consistently and fairly”; and “Environmental regulations are typically enacted 
ahead of most other countries.” 
WEFGOV for 
2001 
This represents the principal component of responses to several World Economic Forum survey 
questions touching on aspects of environmental governance: air pollution regulations, chemical waste 
regulations, clarity and stability of regulations, flexibility of regulations, environmental regulatory 
innovation, environmental policy leadership, stringency of environmental regulations, consistency of 
regulation enforcement, stringency of environmental regulations, toxic waste disposal regulations, and 
water pollution regulations. 
WEFGOV for 
2003 
This represents the principal components of survey questions addressing several aspects of 
environmental governance: air pollution regulations, chemical waste regulations, clarity and stability of 
regulations, flexibility of regulations, environmental regulatory innovation, environmental policy 
leadership, consistency of regulation enforcement, stringency of environmental regulations, toxic waste 
disposal regulations, and water pollution regulations. 
 
 
  28 
Table 3. GDP per worker model 
 Abatement cost intensity Energy intensity DMRW 
index 
EF index WEFSTR WEFGOV 
2001 
WEFGOV 
2003 
Specification Random Fixed  Random Fixed       
Sample period  1996–2003 1996–2003 1990–2003 1990–2003 1992 1992 2000 2001 2003 
ln Capital stock per workeri 0.671*** 
(0.044) 
1.568 
(4.042) 
0.675*** 
(0.074) 
0.595*** 
(0.145) 
0.613*** 
(0.125) 
0.647*** 
(0.047) 
0.288 
(0.178) 
0.386*** 
(0.138) 
0.423** 
(0.171) 
ln Average years of schoolingj 0.043 
(0.033) 
–0.021 
(0.494) 
–0.032 
(0.041) 
–0.013 
(0.108) 
–0.104 
(0.200) 
–0.038 
(0.069) 
–0.006 
(0.042) 
0.022 
(0.035) 
0.037 
(0.042) 
ln Stringencyi –0.647** 
(0.301) 
–1.472 
(2.691) 
–0.648*** 
(0.130) 
–0.688*** 
(0.129) 
1.024 
(1.522) 
0.393 
(0.594) 
1.717** 
(0.763) 
0.778** 
(0.377) 
1.300 
(0.938) 
Constant 3.153*** 
(0.489) 
–4.103 
(39.612) 
–6.501*** 
(1.728) 
–6.522*** 
(1.574) 
–0.236 
(6.063) 
1.969 
(2.371) 
4.928*** 
(1.036) 
5.496** 
(1.232) 
0.697 
(1.850) 
Hausman test Prob>chi2=0.926 Prob>chi2=0.768      
R squared 0.898 0.772 0.826 0.810      
Test of endogeneity   chi2=1.59 
(p=0.66) 
chi2=2.18 
(p=0.54) 
chi2=4.74 
(p=0.19) 
chi2=4.96 
(p=0.17) 
chi2=3.89 
(p=0.27) 
Test of overidentifying 
restrictions 
 
 
 
 
chi2=0.59 
(p=0.44) 
chi2=0.15 
(p=0.70) 
chi2=4.51 
(p=0.10) 
chi2=7.98 
(p=0.05) 
chi2=0.41 
(p=0.52) 
Number of countries 17 17 92 92 23 51 38 37 41 
Observations 84 84 889 889 23 51 38 37 41 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. i and j denote exporters and importers, respectively. *, **, and *** denote significance at 90%, 95%, and 99%, respectively. 
Capital stock per worker, average years of schooling, and stringency variable are instrumented by using 10-year lagged capital stock per worker, 10-year lags for average 
years of schooling for people 40 to 74 years of age, and adjusted savings from CO2 damage and from PE damage.
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Table 4. Gravity model estimation by using energy intensity, abatement cost intensity, and the DMRW and EF indices 
Stringency data Abatement cost intensity Energy intensity DMRW index 
Reference year=1992 
EF index 
Reference year=1992 
Specification (a)  (b)  (c)  (d) (e)  (f)  (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) 
Year used to 
measure 
stringency 
current-yea
r 
one-year-la
gged 
two-year-la
gged 
current-yea
r 
one-year-la
gged 
two-year-la
gged 
1992 1992 1992 1992 1992 1992 
Sample period 
(except for 
stringency) 
1996–2003 1997–2003 1998–2003 1990–2003 1991–2003 1992–2003 1992 1993 1994 1992 1993 1994 
Massijt 1.905*** 
(0.047) 
1.915*** 
(0.063) 
1.926*** 
(0.068) 
1.569*** 
(0.012) 
1.555*** 
(0.012) 
1.552*** 
(0.013) 
1.317 
(1.058) 
1.290 
(1.006) 
1.251** 
(0.490) 
1.534*** 
(0.049) 
1.516*** 
(0.058) 
1.484*** 
(0.064) 
Endwijt –0.146 
(0.106) 
0.080 
(0.154) 
–0.061 
(0.147) 
–0.272*** 
(0.013) 
–0.282*** 
(0.014) 
–0.287*** 
(0.014) 
0.150 
(0.381) 
–0.018 
(0.546) 
0.012 
(0.148) 
–0.111 
(0.087) 
–0.128* 
(0.072) 
–0.085 
(0.083) 
Simijt 0.678*** 
(0.043) 
0.672*** 
(0.056) 
0.667*** 
(0.058) 
0.604*** 
(0.009) 
0.600*** 
(0.009) 
0.601*** 
(0.010) 
0.699 
(1.079) 
0.605 
(1.352) 
0.583 
(0.562) 
0.624*** 
(0.037) 
0.588*** 
(0.047) 
0.589*** 
(0.048) 
ln Distanceij –1.434*** 
(0.065) 
–1.488*** 
(0.086) 
–1.494*** 
(0.090) 
–1.159*** 
(0.016) 
–1.149*** 
(0.016) 
–1.153*** 
(0.017) 
–0.885 
(1.984) 
–0.757 
(1.738) 
–0.721 
(0.701) 
–0.971*** 
(0.042) 
–0.943*** 
(0.045) 
–0.958*** 
(0.052) 
Regional trade 
agreement 
0.121 
(0.281) 
0.296 
(0.433) 
0.171 
(0.416) 
0.438*** 
(0.025) 
0.429*** 
(0.025) 
0.429*** 
(0.027) 
0.339 
(0.998) 
0.222 
(0.640) 
0.151 
(0.737) 
0.081 
(0.116) 
0.022 
(0.144) 
0.007 
(0.136) 
ln Stringencyi –1.419*** 
(0.176) 
–1.892*** 
(0.272) 
–1.961*** 
(0.274) 
–0.395*** 
(0.051) 
–0.401*** 
(0.054) 
–0.403*** 
(0.057) 
3.558 
(30.130) 
3.093 
(23.171) 
3.329 
(10.654) 
1.917*** 
(0.264) 
2.091*** 
(0.365) 
2.505*** 
(0.447) 
Constant –38.644*** 
(1.380) 
–38.443*** 
(1.884) 
–38.920*** 
(2.006) 
–32.880*** 
(0.051) 
–32.497*** 
(0.473) 
–32.458*** 
(0.497) 
–41.931 
(122.732) 
–40.047 
(92.050) 
–40.272 
(40.272) 
–39.647*** 
(1.804) 
–40.257*** 
(1.999) 
–41.109*** 
(2.146) 
Number of 
countries 
17 17 17 89 89 89 26 26 26 56 56 56 
Observations 1568 1372 1176 76422 70566 64874 650 650 650 2506 2506 2506 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. i and j denote exporters and importers, respectively. *, **, and *** denote significance at 90%, 95%, and 99%, respectively. 
Stringency variables are instrumented by using adjusted savings from CO2 damage and from PE damage. 
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Table 5. Gravity model estimation by using the ESI policy indices for aggregate export flows 
Stringency data WEFSTR 
Reference year=2000 
WEFGOV 
Reference year=2001 
WEFGOV 
Reference year=2003 
Specification (m) (n)  (o)  (p)  (q)  (r)  (s) 
Year used for stringency 2000 2000 2000 2001 2001 2001 2003 
Sample period 
(Except for stringency) 
2000 2001 2002 2001 2002 2003 2003 
Massijt 1.573*** 
(0.045) 
1.572*** 
(0.042) 
1.617*** 
(0.039) 
1.648*** 
(0.051) 
1.668*** 
(0.049) 
1.664*** 
(0.046) 
1.668*** 
(0.039) 
Endwijt –0.244*** 
(0.071) 
–0.291*** 
(0.069) 
–0.305*** 
(0.068) 
–0.835*** 
(0.174) 
–0.935*** 
(0.182) 
–0.959*** 
(0.168) 
–0.194*** 
(0.065) 
Simijt 0.692*** 
(0.039) 
0.688*** 
(0.039) 
0.708*** 
(0.037) 
0.685*** 
(0.050) 
0.721*** 
(0.049) 
0.722*** 
(0.049) 
0.718*** 
(0.039) 
Distanceij –1.149*** 
(0.054) 
–1.153*** 
(0.049) 
–1.206*** 
(0.051) 
–0.854*** 
(0.052) 
–0.862*** 
(0.054) 
–0.872*** 
(0.051) 
–1.169*** 
(0.041) 
Regional trade agreement 0.470*** 
(0.097) 
0.453*** 
(0.092) 
0.501*** 
(0.090) 
0.039 
(0.156) 
0.097 
(0.148) 
0.110 
(0.140) 
0.322*** 
(0.086) 
ln Stringencyi 0.428** 
(0.209) 
0.343* 
(0.201) 
0.277 
(0.185) 
0.484 
(0.383) 
0.442 
(0.394) 
0.457 
(0.396) 
1.015*** 
(0.237) 
Constant –29.690*** 
(1.417) 
–29.571*** 
(1.330) 
–30.203*** 
(1.219) 
–32.918*** 
(1.585) 
–33.403*** 
(1.614) 
–33.074*** 
(1.500) 
–35.608*** 
(1.363) 
Number of countries 38 38 38 24 24 24 38 
Observations 1232 1232 1232 484 484 484 1232 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. i and j denote exporters and importers, respectively. *, **, and *** denote significance at 90%, 95%, and 99%, respectively. 
Stringency variables are instrumented by using adjusted savings from CO2 damage and from PE damage. 
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Table 6. Elasticities 
Stringency data Abatement 
cost 
intensity 
Energy 
intensity 
DMRW 
index 
Reference 
year=1992 
EF index 
Reference 
year=1992 
WEFSTR 
Reference 
year=2000 
WEFGOV 
Reference 
year=2001 
WEFGOV 
Reference 
year=2003 
Sample period 1996–2003 1990–2003 1992 1992 2000 2001 2003 
Elasticity 
(Direct) 
–0.047*** –0.013*** 0.118 0.064*** 0.014** 0.016 0.034*** 
Elasticity 
(Indirect) 
–0.031** –0.005*** 0.014 0.008 0.039** 0.052** 0.029 
Elasticity 
(Overall) 
–0.078** –0.018*** 0.132 0.072 0.053** 0.041 0.063 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote significance at 90%, 95%, and 99%, respectively. 
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Table A.1 Country list for energy intensity and abatement cost intensity 
Energy intensity 
89 countries 
Abatement cost 
intensity 
17 countries 
Argentina 
Australia 
Austria 
Bangladesh 
Belgium 
Bolivia 
Brazil 
Bulgaria 
Cameroon 
Canada 
Chile 
China 
Colombia 
Republic of Congo 
Costa Rica 
Cote d'Ivoire 
Croatia 
Czech Republic 
Denmark 
Dominican Republic 
Ecuador 
Egypt 
El Salvador 
Ethiopia 
Finland 
France 
Georgia 
Germany 
Ghana 
Greece 
Guatemala 
Honduras 
Hong Kong 
Hungary 
Iceland 
India 
Indonesia 
Iran 
Ireland 
Israel 
Italy 
Jamaica 
Japan 
Jordan 
Kazakhstan 
Kenya 
Korea, Rep. 
Luxembourg 
Macedonia 
Malaysia 
Mexico 
Morocco 
Mozambique 
Nepal 
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Nicaragua 
Nigeria 
Norway 
Pakistan 
Panama 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Philippines 
Poland 
Portugal 
Romania 
Russia 
Senegal 
Slovak Republic 
South Africa 
Spain 
Sri Lanka 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Syrian Arab Republic 
Tanzania 
Thailand 
Togo 
Trinidad and Tobago 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
Ukraine 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Hungary 
Iceland 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Poland 
Portugal 
Spain 
Sweden 
Turkey 
United Kingdom 
United States 
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Table A.2 Country list for policy indices 
Dasgupta et al. (2001) 
26 countries 
Eliste and Fredriksson (2002) 
56 countries 
WEFSTR for 2000, WEFGOV for 2001, and 
WEFGOV for 2003 
38 countries 
Bangladesh 
Brazil 
Bulgaria 
China 
Egypt 
Finland 
Germany 
Ghana 
India 
Ireland 
Jamaica 
Jordan 
Kenya 
Korea, Rep. 
Malawi 
Mozambique 
Netherlands 
Pakistan 
Papua New 
Paraguay 
Philippines 
Switzerland 
Tanzania 
Thailand 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
Tunisia 
Zambia 
Argentina 
Australia 
Austria 
Bangladesh 
Brazil 
Bulgaria 
Canada 
Chile 
China 
Colombia 
Czechoslovakia 
Denmark 
Ecuador 
Egypt  
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Ghana 
Greece 
Hungary 
Iceland 
India 
Ireland 
Italy 
Jamaica 
Japan 
Jordan 
Kenya 
Korea, 
Rep. 
Malawi 
Mexico 
Morocco 
Mozambique 
Netherlands 
New 
Zealand 
Norway 
Pakistan 
Papua New 
Guinea 
Paraguay 
Philippines 
Poland 
Portugal 
Senegal 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Tanzania 
Thailand 
Trinidad 
and Tobago 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
United 
Kingdom 
United 
States 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
Zambia 
Argentina* 
Australia 
Austria 
Belgium 
Brazil* 
Bulgaria* 
Canada 
Chile* 
China* 
Colombia* 
Costa 
Rica* 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Hungary* 
Iceland 
India* 
Indonesia* 
Ireland 
Italy 
Japan 
Korea, Rep. 
Malaysia 
Mexico* 
Netherlands 
New 
Zealand 
Norway 
Philippines* 
Poland* 
Portugal 
South 
Africa* 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Thailand* 
United 
Kingdom 
United 
States 
Note: * not included in our gravity model using WEFGOV for 2001 due to data limitation.
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Table B.1. Definition of decomposed indices 
Index  Definition 
overall 
Stringency of environmental 
regulations 
The stringency of overall environmental regulations 
in your country is: (1=lax compared with most other 
countries, 7=among the world’s most stringent) 
leader 
Environmental policy leadership Compared with other countries, your country 
normally enacts environmental regulations: (1 = much 
later, 7 = ahead of most others) 
cla_sta 
Clarity and stability of 
regulations 
Environmental regulations in your country are: (1 = 
confusing and frequently changing, 7 = transparent 
and stable) 
flex 
Flexibility of regulations Environmental regulations in your country: (1 = offer 
no options for achieving compliance, 7 = are flexible 
and offer many options for achieving compliance) 
enforce 
Consistency of regulation 
enforcement 
Environmental regulation in your country is: (1 = not 
enforced or enacted erratically, 7 = enforced 
consistently and fairly) 
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Table C.1. GDP per worker model 
 Abatement cost intensity Energy intensity WEFSTR WEFGOV 
2001 
WEFGOV 
2003 
Specification Random Fixed Random Fixed    
Sample period  1997–2003 1997–2003 1997–2003 1997-2003 2000 2001 2003 
ln Capital stock per workeri 0.584*** 
(0.101) 
0.906 
(2.568) 
0.942* 
(0.560) 
0.959*** 
(0.131) 
0.225 
(0.181) 
0.568*** 
(0.090) 
0.496*** 
(0.172) 
ln Average years of schoolingj 0.077 
(0.054) 
–0.054 
(0.271) 
–0.110 
(0.222) 
–0.057 
(0.053) 
0.036 
(0.043) 
0.033 
(0.025) 
0.065* 
(0.037) 
ln Stringencyi –1.010*** 
(0.353) 
–1.009 
(1.533) 
–0.635*** 
(0.212) 
–0.539*** 
(0.168) 
2.052*** 
(0.700) 
0.465 
(0.313) 
1.097* 
(0.655) 
ln R & D expenditures 1.015 
(0.862) 
–6.344 
(20.773) 
0.602 
(1.669) 
–1.428*** 
(0.502) 
–1.246*** 
(0.474) 
–0.314 
(0.580) 
–0.608 
(0.541) 
Constant 0.820 
(2.193) 
21.156 
(37.874) 
–10.300** 
(4.324) 
–3.248 
(2.592) 
8.612*** 
(1.911) 
4.685** 
(2.269) 
2.297 
(1.422) 
Hausman test Prob>chi2=1.000 Prob>chi2=0.844    
R squared 0.797 0.333 0.796 0.842    
Test of endogeneity     chi2=10.14 
(p=0.04) 
chi2=5.80 
(p=0.21) 
chi2=3.81 
(p=0.43) 
Test of overidentifying 
restrictions 
    chi2=1.41 
(p=0.49) 
chi2=4.26 
(p=0.23) 
chi2=0.40 
(p=0.53) 
Number of countries 14 14 53 53 26 24 29 
Observations 68 68 227 277 26 24 29 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. i and j denote exporters and importers, respectively. *, **, 
and *** denote significance at 90%, 95%, and 99%, respectively. Capital stock per worker, average years 
of schooling, and stringency variable are instrumented by using 10-year lagged capital stock per worker, 
10-year lags for average years of schooling for people 40 to 74 years of age, adjusted savings from CO2 
damage and from PE damage, and. one year lags for R&D expenditures. Because the data period of R&D 
expenditures is from 1996, we cannot use DMRW index and EF index. 
 
Table C.2. Gravity model estimation by using energy intensity, and abatement cost intensity 
Stringency data Abatement cost intensity Energy intensity 
Specification (a)  (b)  (c)  (d) (e)  (f)  
Year used to 
measure 
stringency 
current-y
ear 
one-year-lagged two-year-lagged current-year one-year-lagged two-year-lagged 
Sample period 
(except for 
stringency) 
1997–20
03 
1998–2003 1999–2003 1997–2003 1998–2003 1999–2003 
Massijt 1.906*** 
(0.077) 
1.895*** 
(0.110) 
1.903*** 
(0.099) 
1.703*** 
(0.026) 
1.698*** 
(0.026) 
1.697*** 
(0.027) 
Endwijt –0.147 
(0.182) 
0.186 
(0.238) 
–0.103 
(0.163) 
–0.219*** 
(0.027) 
–0.223*** 
(0.027) 
–0.224*** 
(0.028) 
Simijt 0.683*** 
(0.075) 
0.686*** 
(0.091) 
0.695*** 
(0.080) 
0.661*** 
(0.021) 
0.659*** 
(0.021) 
0.659*** 
(0.020) 
Distanceij –1.578**
* 
(0.115) 
–1.597*** 
(0.149) 
–1.559*** 
(0.121) 
–1.067*** 
(0.030) 
–1.060*** 
(0.030) 
–1.057*** 
(0.030) 
Regional trade 
agreement 
0.030 
(0.332) 
–0.365 
(0.463) 
–0.161 
(0.408) 
–0.371*** 
(0.056) 
–0.371*** 
(0.056) 
–0.374*** 
(0.056) 
ln Stringencyi –2.092**
* 
(0.380) 
–2.435*** 
(0.661) 
–2.102*** 
(0.358) 
–0.510*** 
(0.136) 
–0.512*** 
(0.137) 
–0.493*** 
(0.138) 
Constant –38.255*
** 
(1.981) 
–37.706*** 
(2.826) 
–38.052*** 
(2.609) 
–37.933*** 
(1.296) 
–37.644*** 
(1.295) 
–37.454*** 
(1.305) 
Number of 
countries 
14 14 14 53 53 53 
Observations 887 708 638 17611 17341 17140 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. i and j denote exporters and importers, 
respectively. *, **, and *** denote significance at 90%, 95%, and 99%, respectively. 
Stringency variables are instrumented by using adjusted savings from CO2 damage and from 
PE damage.  
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Table C.3. Gravity model estimation by using the ESI policy indices for aggregate export flows 
Stringency data WEFSTR 
Reference year=2000 
WEFGOV 
Reference year=2001 
WEFGOV 
Reference 
year=2003 
Specification (m) (n)  (o)  (p)  (q)  (r)  (s) 
Year used for 
stringency 
2000 2000 2000 2001 2001 2001 2003 
Sample period 
(Except for 
stringency) 
2000 2001 2002 2001 2002 2003 2003 
Massijt 1.634*** 
(0.068) 
1.622*** 
(0.053) 
1.632*** 
(0.055) 
1.705*** 
(0.043) 
1.736*** 
(0.050) 
1.689*** 
(0.038) 
1.739*** 
(0.038) 
Endwijt –0.398*** 
(0.084) 
–0.426*** 
(0.073) 
–0.350*** 
(0.084) 
–0.271*** 
(0.067) 
–0.280*** 
(0.088) 
–0.110 
(0.074) 
–0.107 
(0.071) 
Simijt 0.777*** 
(0.051) 
0.680*** 
(0.047) 
0.706*** 
(0.053) 
0.739*** 
(0.045) 
0.800*** 
(0.049) 
0.749*** 
(0.041) 
0.753*** 
(0.042) 
Distanceij –1.154*** 
(0.079) 
–1.063*** 
(0.050) 
–1.255*** 
(0.072) 
–1.037*** 
(0.048) 
–1.244*** 
(0.057) 
–1.180*** 
(0.048) 
–1.216*** 
(0.048) 
Regional trade 
agreement 
–0.530*** 
(0.129) 
–0.283** 
(0.113) 
–0.682*** 
(0.122) 
0.090 
(0.102) 
–0.611*** 
(0.125) 
–0.259*** 
(0.104) 
–0.252** 
(0.102) 
ln Stringencyi 0.192 
(0.345) 
0.335 
(0.220) 
0.024 
(0.288) 
0.729*** 
(0.127) 
0.378*** 
(0.144) 
0.540*** 
(0.129) 
1.144*** 
(0.254) 
Constant –30.695*** 
(2.020) 
–31.731*** 
(1.640) 
–29.609*** 
(1.602) 
–34.871*** 
(1.261) 
–33.188*** 
(1.394) 
–32.812*** 
(1.108) 
–37.850*** 
(1.484) 
Number of 
countries 
38 38 38 24 24 24 38 
Observations 1232 1232 1232 484 484 484 1232 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. i and j denote exporters and importers, 
respectively. *, **, and *** denote significance at 90%, 95%, and 99%, respectively. 
Stringency variables are instrumented by using adjusted savings from CO2 damage and from 
PE damage. 
 
 
 
